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NOTES
COMPULSORY PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION IN
SEXUAL OFFENSE CASES: INVASION OF PRIVACY
OR DEFENDANT'S RIGHT?
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the issue of victims' rights in sexual offense' cases has
raised a variety of troubling legal problems.2 Courts are frequently
forced to decide thorny issues which are of special importance in sexual
offense cases. For example, it must be determined whether the com-
plaining witness will be allowed to testify,3 whether her testimony must
be corroborated by independent evidence,4 and whether she can be forced
to undergo a psychological examination.5 Courts that have considered
whether a complaining witness in a sexual offense case may be compelled
to undergo a psychological examination have reached varying conclu-
sions. Some courts have decided that they can order a psychological ex-
amination when a defendant presents a compelling reason to have such
an examination conducted.6 Another has determined that it may order a
psychological examination when the prosecutrix is young.7 Courts in an-
other jurisdiction, however, have determined the psychological examina-
tion of a complaining witness in a sexual offense case cannot be ordered
1. See Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of
SexualAbuse Victims, 74 Geo. L.J. 429, 429 n.1 (1985).
The term sexual offense describes a variety of incidents, from exposure and fondling to
intercourse, incest and rape. There are five separate sexual offenses: 1) forcible rape, in
which physical threats are used to achieve sexual intercourse; 2) nonforcible rape, com-
monly called statutory rape, involving sexual intercourse between an adult and a child
who does not resist; 3) sodomy; 4) incest; and 5) indecent liberties, including a wide
variety of acts such as physical advances and the use of obscene language. See id.
2. Some of these problems have been whether leading questions will be allowed;
whether hearsay evidence from a doctor, social worker, teacher, or parent will be admit-
ted; and whether an expert should be permitted to testify that the victim's behavior is
indicative of a sexual offense. See id. at 430-31.
3. See id; Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 245, 246, 132 S.E.2d 648, 648-49 (1963); Mackler v.
State, 164 Ga. App. 874, 874-75, 298 S.E.2d 589, 591 (1982).
4. See, e.g., State v. Haston, 64 Ariz. 72, 74, 166 P.2d 141, 144 (1946) (decision on
whether corroboration is required); Alvarado v. State, 63 Ariz. 511, 514, 164 P.2d 460,
462 (1945) (same); Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 1128, 86 S.E.2d 828, 834-35
(1955) (same).
5. See, e.g., People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 195, 443 P.2d 794, 800, 70 Cal. Rptr.
210, 216 (decision on compulsory psychological examination), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864
(1968); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 174-76, 410 P.2d 838, 848-49, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 312-13 (1966) (same); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 16-17, 256 N.E.2d 901,
902-03 (1970) (same); People v. Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 282-83, 524 N.Y.S.2d 153, 156
(1988) (same).
6. See, e.g., Russel, 69 Cal. 2d at 196, 443 P.2d at 801, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17
(compelling reason that prosecutrix not credible); Ballard, 64 Cal. 2d at 176-77, 410 P.2d
at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (compelling reason that state's testimony uncorroborated and
complaining witness' veracity affected by her mental state).
7. See Easterday, 254 Ind. at 17, 256 N.E.2d at 903.
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without express legislative authorization to do so.8
This Note considers issues involved in court-compelled psychological
examinations of prosecutrixes in sexual offense cases. Part I discusses the
power of courts to order such examinations. Part II examines factors
considered by courts in determining whether to order psychological ex-
aminations, once the court has concluded that it has the power to do so.
Part III examines the constitutional issue raised by a court-ordered psy-
chological examination. Part III also analyzes Ballard v. Superior
Court,9 the first decision to hold that a trial judge has discretion to order
a psychological examination of a complaining witness in a sexual offense
case if the defendant presents compelling reasons to conduct such an ex-
amination. This Note concludes that courts have discretion to order a
prosecutrix to undergo a psychological examination if little or no corrob-
oration supports the sexual offense charge, or if the defense charges that
the complaining witness's mental or emotional condition casts serious
doubt on her veracity.
I. POWER OF COURTS TO COMPEL PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS
Courts are understandably wary of overstepping the authority granted
to them by the legislature.10 This concern has factored into courts' anal-
yses of whether they will compel a prosecutrix to undergo a psychologi-
cal examination in a criminal case, absent express legislative
authorization."' Federal courts routinely employ a congressional grant
of power to order psychological examinations of litigants in civil cases if
the mental condition of the party is in controversy. 2 There is, however,
no parallel power given to the courts in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure; 3 hence, some courts are reluctant to order such an examina-
8. See, e.g., State v. Hiatt, 303 Or. 60, 64-68, 733 P.2d 1373, 1376-77 (1987); State v.
Olsen, 295 Or. 107, 109, 663 P.2d 767, 768 (1983); State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 330,
412 P.2d 23, 24 (1966).
9. 64 Cal. 2d at 159, 410 P.2d at 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
10. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 330-31 (1987) (White, J., dissenting); Shea
v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 62 (White, J., dissenting) (1985); Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co., 207 U.S. 463, 483 (1908); People v. Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d
153, 156-57 (1988); Hiatt, 303 Or. at 65, 733 P.2d at 1377; Olsen, 295 Or. at 109, 663
P.2d at 768.
11. See Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 15-16, 256 N.E.2d 901, 902 (1970); Griffin,
138 Misc. 2d at 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57; Olsen, 295 Or. at 110, 663 P.2d at 769.
12. See, e.g., Hayes v. Lockhart, 869 F.2d 358, 359 (8th Cir. 1989) (court-ordered
mental examination of litigant); Toth v. TWA, 862 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1988)
(same); Pool v. Armontrout, 852 F.2d 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1172 (1989) (same); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 326 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 35(a) "[w]hen the mental or physical condition of a party... is in controversy,
the court ... may order the party to submit to a physical examination ... or mental
examination. .. ."
13. See United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D 340, 342 (1966) ("The subpoena powers of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure fall significantly short of affording a defendant
the right to [a] mental examination of an important witness.").
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tion. 4 These courts have concluded that a judicial determination giving
a court the power to order the psychological examination of a prosecu-
trix in a sexual offense case is an invasion of the province of the legisla-
ture, 5 because the legislature is the branch of government empowered to
enact rules regulating court procedures. 16
The weight of authority, however, indicates that courts do have the
power to order a prosecutrix to undergo a psychological examination.17
While no specific statutory authorization or case law exists for ordering a
prosecutrix to undergo a psychological examination, neither is needed to
give courts the power to order such an examination.18 Most courts see
the lack of express authority as an invitation to interpret a general grant
of power19 as authorizing a court to order the examination when, in the
court's discretion, it is proper to do so.20 It is a court's role not only to
interpret the law,2 but also to take actions reasonably necessary to ad-
minister justice.22 A psychological examination could be crucial to the
14. These courts base their refusal on the absence of express authorization in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which these states have adopted. See State v. Hi-
att, 303 Or. 60, 65-66, 733 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1987).
15. See Dildy, 39 F.R.D. at 342; Hiatt, 303 Or. at 65, 733 P.2d at 1376.
16. See Note, Psychiatric Examination of Prosecutrix in Rape Case, 45 N.C.L. Rev.
234, 239-40 (1966).
These courts are also concerned with the larger issue of the long-term results of al-
lowing psychologists to testify that a victim is credible. First, the courts are worried that
the psychologist's expert opinion about the prosecutrix might confuse the jury. That is,
the jury may base its finding of credibility solely on the psychologist's testimony,
although the jury is required to reach a conclusion about the victim's credibility on its
own. See Hiatt, 303 Or. at 65, 733 P.2d at 1378; Walgraeve, 243 Or. at 333, 412 P.2d at
24. Second, the courts are concerned with "the delay of the trial of the guilt or innocence
of the accused by the [psychologist testifying as to] the mental state of the witness .... "
Walgraeve, 243 Or. at 331, 412 P.2d at 24. Third, a jury may have difficulty understand-
ing an expert witness's testimony concerning the effect of a victim's mental state on her
ability to distinguish fact from fantasy. See United States v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515, 519
(7th Cir. 1982); Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 620, 627 (1987). Hence, the time that
it would take the expert to explain the effect would delay the judicial proceedings. See
United States v. Weaver, 882 F.2d 1128, 1136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 415
(1989).
17. See, e.g., People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 195, 443 P.2d 794, 800, 70 Cal. Rptr.
210, 216, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159,
176, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 17,
256 N.E.2d 901, 903 (1970); People v. Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d 153,
156-57 (1988).
18. See Easterday, 254 Ind. at 15-16, 256 N.E.2d at 902-03; Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d at
284, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57.
19. An example of a grant of power from the legislature is that a court has power to
devise procedures necessary to effect its inherent powers of equity. See Griffin, 138 Misc.
2d at 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
20. See id.
21. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Note, Special Issue on Legislation- Statutory and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion: Legislative Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 691, 692 (1987).
22. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924); ITT Community Dev.
1990] 1259
1260 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
truth-seeking process."z Because the legislature has granted courts the
power to devise and implement the procedures necessary to effect the
courts' general powers,24 courts can interpret the existing law, and legiti-
mately order a prosecutrix to undergo a psychological examination,
when in the court's discretion, a psychological examination is necessary
to ensure a fair trial and to administer justice effectively.25
II. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DECISIONS ON COURT-
COMPELLED EXAMINATIONS
If a court determines that it lacks power to order a prosecutrix to un-
dergo a psychological examination, no psychological examination will be
ordered.2 6 However, if it determines or assumes that it has the power to
order such an examination, it then considers whether an examination
should be ordered based on the particular case under consideration.
Most courts addressing the question of whether to compel a psychologi-
cal examination of a sexual offense prosecutrix weigh two factors in
reaching their decision: whether the possibility of a psychological exami-
nation will deter victims from reporting their crimes2 7 and the credibility
of the prosecutrix.28
A. Deterrent Effect of a Court-Compelled Psychological Examination
A sexual offense victim is often forced to endure embarrassing formali-
ties.2 9 For example, the government almost always requires an intimate
physical examination of the prosecutrix to corroborate her testimony.30
These procedures alone could be enough to discourage a victim of a sex-
ual offense from reporting her crime.31 A psychological examination
adds an extra impediment to a victim reporting a sexual offense, 32 and
Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978); Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.2d 62,
64 (Ky. 1984); Craft v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961).
23. See People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 195, 443 P.2d 794, 800, 70 Cal Rptr. 210,
216, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 17, 256 N.E.2d
901, 905 (1970).
24. See Griffln, 138 Misc. 2d at 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
25. See Russel, 69 Cal. 2d at 195, 443 P.2d at 800, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 216; Easterday,
254 Ind. at 16-17, 256 N.E.2d at 903; Griffln, 138 Misc. 2d at 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
27. See Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 343 (D.D.C. 1966).
28. See Russel, 69 Cal. 2d at 195, 443 P.2d at 800, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 216; Easterday,
254 Ind. at 17, 256 N.E.2d at 903; Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d at 283, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
29. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
30. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1973); People v. Ander-
son, 20 Ill. App. 3d 840, 849, 314 N.E.2d 651, 657 (1974). See generally N.Y. Pen. Law
§ 130.16 (McKinney 1987) ("A person shall not be convicted of... [a sexual offense]
solely on the testimony of the victim, unsupported by other evidence .....
31. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 343 (1966) (psychological exami-
nation deters victim from reporting crime); People v. Mills, 87 Cal. App. 3d 302, 307, 151
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would be one more burden for a victim to consider before making the
decision to file a complaint.
Courts have recognized and discussed the possible deterrent effect of
compulsory psychological examinations.33 One court determined that a
compulsory psychological examination could not be ordered because
"[t]he continuous accumulation of intimidating and indelicate proce-
dural probings tend to induce to silence all but the most hardened vic-
tims."' 34 Another court found that a sexual offense victim's trauma
might be increased by a compulsory psychological examination, and
might deter her from filing a complaint.35
Although this deterrent effect is a legitimate consideration, it may have
been overemphasized. The existence of compulsory physical examina-
tions, because of their intrusive nature, also could have a deterrent effect
on victims. 36 In fact, because the type of physical examination con-
ducted to confirm a sexual attack is more intrusive than a psychological
examination, 37 physical exams are likely to have a much greater deter-
rent effect than do psychological examinations.38 It has been determined,
however, that courts have the power to order a physical examination of
the prosecutrix in a sexual offense case and they frequently exercise it.39
While physical examinations indicate whether a sexual offense oc-
curred,' mental examinations answer the equally crucial question of
whether the prosecutrix is credible.41 Fairness to defendants, therefore,
dictates that the need for the examination should not be outweighed by
the examination's possible deterrent effect.4'
B. The Relationship Between the Prosecutrix's Age and Her Credibility
Courts often order psychological examinations of witnesses whose
credibility is doubtful. 3 In sexual offense cases, courts consider whether
Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (1978) (same); State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 331, 412 P.2d 23, 27
(1966) (same).
33. See Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dildy, 39 F.R.D. at 343; Baker v. State, 526 So. 2d 202, 204 (1988).
34. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. at 343; see also Scuito, 623 F.2d at 875 (psychological examina-
tions deter victims from reporting crimes).
35. See Scuito, 623 F.2d at 875; see also Baker, 526 So. 2d at 204 (court would not
"permit the random exploration of [a victim's credibility by subjecting her to] embarrass-
ing psychological tests").
36. See Note, supra note 16, at 240.
37. See id. at 238.
38. See id.
39. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 2 (1941); People v. Kemp, 139 Cal. App.
48, 50, 34 P.2d 502, 503-04 (1934); People v. Porcaro, 6 N.Y.2d 248, 249, 160 N.E.2d
488, 489, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (1959).
40. See People v. Pearson, 70 Cal. 2d 218, 219, 449 P.2d 217, 219, 74 Cal. Rptr. 281,
283, (1969); People v. Insignares, 121 Misc. 2d 921, 930, 470 N.Y.S.2d 513, 520 (1983).
41. See Note, supra note 16, at 239.
42. See id.
43. See People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 196, 443 P.2d 794, 800-01, 70 Cal. Rptr.
210, 216-17, cert. denied 393 U.S. 864 (1968); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 14, 256
1990] 1261
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the prosecutrix's veracity is subject to doubt either because of her back-
ground or because of some personal quality. Children, for example, pose
special credibility problems as prosecutrixes in sexual offense cases.
Small children, at times, may falsely accuse someone of forcing them to
engage in sexual acts." The court in Easterday v. State45 recognized this
tendency when it determined that a ten-year-old prosecutrix in a sexual
offense case had to submit to a psychological examination because of her
age and because she had lied in the past.46
Professor Wigmore espouses a more extreme view: "[n]o judge should
ever let a sex-offence [sic] charge go to the jury unless the female com-
plainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and
testified to by a qualified physician."'47 Professor Wigmore's view logi-
cally would include situations in which the victim is a child because the
risks that are present when adults are involved also exist when one of the
parties is a child.48
The prosecutrix's age, and her resulting credibility, or lack of credibil-
ity, are legitimate considerations for the court. Because of their inability
to appreciate the consequences of fabricating a story about a sexual of-
fense a child, not realizing the severe consequences of a false accusation,
could make such accusations to exact revenge on a parent or caregiver.4
In a situation where, either before or after examining the evidence, a
court determines that a prosecutrix might have falsely accused the de-
fendant, it should seriously consider ordering a psychological examina-
tion of the prosecutrix to protect the accused. 0
N.E.2d 901, 901 (1970); People v. Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 283, 524 N.Y.S.2d 153, 156
(1988).
44. See Easterday, 254 Ind. at 19, 256 N.E.2d at 903-04; see also J. McCaghy, Child
Molesting, Sexual Behavior, Aug. 1971, at § 16-21 (emotionally disturbed child might
falsely accuse stepparent of sexual assault).
45. 254 Ind. at 13, 256 N.E.2d at 901.
46. Id. at 17, 256 N.E.2d at 903.
47. J. Wigmore, Evidence § 924(a), at 737 (1970).
48. Professor Wigmore is concerned with various risks, including 1) that "frequently
sexual assault is charged or claimed with nothing more substantial supporting this belief
than an unrealized wish or unconscious... thwarting," J. Wigmore, supra note 47, § 924
(a), at 736; 2) the severity of the penalties for sex crimes, see N.Y. Pen. Law at § 130.35
(McKinney 1987); 3) the potential injury to reputation caused by a false accusation, and
4) the emotional harm to the accused that can result from a false accusation. See J. Wig-
more, supra note 47, § 924(a), at 736.
49. See J. McCaghy, supra note 45, at § 16-2 (quoting L. Bender, psychiatrist from
New York State Psychiatric Institute). See generally Wash. Post, Nov. 13, at Cl, col. 5
(study by Virginia Department of Social Services concluded that since 1978, number of
false reports of sexual offenses against children has risen by 300%).
50. See Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 21, 256 N.E.2d 901, 902 (1970); People v.
Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (1988).
Courts should also seriously consider the prosecutrix's credibility when, for instance,
an adult prosecutrix has a record of perjury convictions. See Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d at 283,




If a victim in a sexual offense case is forced to undergo a psychological
examination, not only may her emotional well-being be compromised,
but her constitutional fights may be violated as well.51 Because of the
potential for a constitutional violation, a court must carefully consider
whether the interests supporting the examination outweigh the invasion
of the prosecutrix's right of privacy 2 that could result if she is compelled
to undergo the examination.53
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether the right of
privacy encompasses an individual's fight to refuse to undergo a psycho-
logical examination. However, in Schmerber v. California,54 the Court
found that the unreasonable testing of one's blood is an invasion of the
fight of privacy,5 based on the Court's determination that the right pro-
tects individuals against disclosure of personal matters.56 A blood test
can reveal certain highly personal matters, such as alcoholism 57 or vene-
real disease.5 8 A compulsory psychological examination, however, impli-
51. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
52. The right of privacy was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The boundaries of the right have not been clearly
defined. The Court has stated only that the right protects areas of marriage, family and
procreation. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3043 (1989);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
53. Jurisdictions that follow this principle have determined that there are several situ-
ations in which the merits of the examination outweigh its possible detrimental effect, for
example, when the prosecutrix's credibility is doubtful. See People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d
187, 196-97, 443 P.2d 794, 800-01, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-17, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864
(1968); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 176, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 313 (1966); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 21-22, 256 N.E.2d 901, 905-06 (1970);
see also J. Wigmore, supra note 48, § 924(a), at 736 (mental or moral delusion frequently
found in young girls, causing distortion of imagination in sex cases); J. McCaghy, supra
note 45, at § 16-21 (emotionally disturbed children may falsely accuse adults of sex
crimes).
A prosecutrix's credibility is not doubtful when the court determines that her mental
condition is stable. See Easterday, 254 Ind. at 16, 256 N.E.2d at 902 (court noted vic-
tim's demeanor and concluded psychological examination unnecessary). The court de-
cides the issue of stability by observing the prosecutrix both before and during trial. Id.
at 17, 254 N.E.2d at 902.
The value of the examination also outweighs its detrimental effect when the prosecutrix
is young, see Lowe v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (1989); Pearish v. State, 264 Ind. 339,
340, 344 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1976); Easterday, 254 Ind. at 19, 256 N.E.2d at 903, and when
the prosecutrix has a reputation for lying. See Pearish, 264 Ind. at 342, 344 N.E.2d at
298; Easterday, 254 Ind. at 17, 256 N.E.2d at 903.
54. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
55. Id. at 767-68.
56. Id.
57. See New York v. Snow, 74 N.Y.2d 671, 672, 541 N.E.2d 414, 415, 543 N.Y.S.2d
385, 386 (1989); Rittenhouse v. State, 134 A.D.2d 774, 775, 521 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826
(1987).
58. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 919, 616 P.2d 813, 814,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 832 (1980); People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 255, 260 P.2d 8, 10
(1953), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 931 (1954); Hathaway v. Superior Court of Fresno County,
112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 736, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1980).
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cates similar privacy interests. 9 A psychological examination can reveal
certain personal matters, such as schizophrenia,' paranoid personality,61
or neurological deficiencies.62 The individual has an interest in prevent-
ing the disclosure of such personal matters; therefore, a psychological
examination, which may reveal them, should also merit protection by the
right of privacy.
A. Interests of the State, Victim, and Defendant in Sexual Offense
Cases
When a court order could potentially violate an individual's protected
constitutional rights, the court balances the interests involved to deter-
mine whether the order should issue.63 In a sexual offense case, the state,
the victim and the defendant have different and competing interests that
the court must weigh in deciding whether to interfere with the prosecu-
trix's right of privacy by requiring her to undergo a psychological
examination.
First, the state has an interest in punishing only guilty defendants. 6 4
This interest can be served by compelling a prosecutrix to undergo a psy-
chological examination. If a psychologist examines a prosecutrix before
trial6 5 and determines that she cannot distinguish fact from fantasy, the
psychologist can testify to this at trial as part of an effort to persuade the
59. In Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988), the court determined that the right
of privacy encompasses the right to refuse to undergo an unreasonable psychiatric exami-
nation. See id. at 13. In Daury, a school principal was required to submit to a psychiatric
examination as a condition of continued employment. See id. at 12. The principal
claimed that this requirement violated his right to privacy as guaranteed by the ninth and
fourteenth amendments. See id. at 10. Although the court held that the principal's con-
stitutional rights had not been violated by the compulsory psychiatric examination, it
determined that the right of privacy does encompass an individual's right to refuse to
undergo an unreasonable psychiatric examination. See id. The court found that the right
of privacy includes "the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."
See id. By its very nature, a psychological examination involves such a disclosure. See id.
at 13. Therefore, it should be protected by the privacy right. See id.
60. See Anonymous v. State, 17 A.D.2d 495, 496, 236 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89-90 (1963).
61. See Cornell v. Evans, 88 A.D.2d 684, 684, 450 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (1982).
62. See Ayub v. Ideal Toy Co., 50 A.D.2d 1051, 1052, 377 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (1975).
63. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (Court balanced individ-
ual's interest in religious autonomy and state's interest in educating children); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (Court balanced individual's interest in religious
autonomy against state's interest in preventing communicable disease).
64. It is basic to Anglo-American law that only individuals who have broken the law
and are responsible for their actions should be punished. See Hopkins v. Lynn, 888 F.2d
35, 37 (5th Cir. 1989). See generally W. Ferguson & A. Stokke, Concepts of Criminal
Law 86-89 (1976) (insane defendants, not responsible for their actions, are blameless and
should not be punished); S. Kadish, Blame and Punishment 238 (1987) (punishment may
not be imposed absent blameworthy conduct). Therefore, if an accused is innocent, the
purposes of the criminal justice system would be thwarted by punishing him. See W.
Ferguson & A. Stokke, supra, at 90.
65. See Note, Criminal Law- State v. Looney: Defendant's Needfor Court Ordered
Psychiatric Evaluations of Witnesses' Outweighed by Witnesses' Right to Privacy, 57
N.C.L. Rev. 448, 458 n.67 (1979).
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jury that the defendant is innocent.66
A state also has an interest in punishing the accused,67 and in ensuring
that the victim is not harmed again.6 8 The victim of a sexual offense
shares these interests.69 However, the victim also has a privacy interest
that may be implicated if a court orders her to undergo a psychological
examination.7" The court must carefully balance all of the relevant inter-
ests in deciding whether to compel the examination. If the interests of
the state and the defendant do not outweigh the victim's interests,71 forc-
ing the victim to undergo such an examination would be an unwarranted
invasion of her constitutionally protected right of privacy.72
Finally, a defendant has an interest in remaining free of warrantless
accusations.73 This can occur when a victim mistakenly accuses the de-
fendant of a sexual offense, especially where, for example, she suffers
from a type of mental defect that renders her unable to distinguish fact
from fantasy74 or when she is a liar.75 The defendant, therefore, has an
interest in having the prosecutrix submit to a psychological examination
to reveal the falsity of the accusation, thereby sparing him the embarrass-
ment and damage to reputation resulting from a trial. In this situation,
the defendant's right to be free from a warrantless accusation outweighs
intrusions into the prosecutrix's right of privacy.76
B. Ballard Balancing Test
Because a balancing of competing interests must be employed to deter-
mine whether it is proper for a court to order a psychological examina-
tion, an inflexible rule that directs courts to order victims to undergo
psychological examinations in all sexual offense cases, or a rule prohibit-
66. Fed. R. Evid. 702 states that "[[if scientific... or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence... [an expert] witness... may testify
... in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
67. See N.Y. Pen. Law, § 130.35 (McKinney 1987).
68. See W. Ferguson & A. Stokke, supra note 65, at 90-91.
69. Id. The victim can take steps to effectuate these interests by filing a complaint.
See Note, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes Feminism Unmodified,
41 Stan. L. Rev. 761, 767 (1989); Note, Real Reform, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1978, 1980
(1988).
70. See Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
71. The interests of the state and defendant do not outweigh the interests of the vic-
tim when the victim is credible or when the victim's testimony is corroborated. See Bal-
lard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 160, 410 P.2d 838, 841, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304
(1966).
72. See United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 342 (1966); People v. Griffin, 138
Misc. 2d 279, 284, 524 N.Y.S. 153, 156-57 (1988).
73. See J. Wigmore, supra note 48, § 924(a), at 736; supra notes 43-47 and accompa-
nying text.
74. See Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 19, 256 N.E.2d 901, 903 (1970).
75. Id. at 19, 256 N.E.2d at 903-04.
76. See People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 188, 443 P.2d 792, 794, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210,
212 (1968); Easterday, 254 Ind. at 14, 256 N.E.2d at 902; Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d at 280,
524 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
1990] 1265
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ing courts from ordering these examinations under any circumstances
would be untenable. A rule directing courts to order victims to undergo
psychological examinations in all sexual offense cases would consider
only the interests of the state and the defendant, ignoring the interests of
the victim. This would be a clear invasion of the victim's right of pri-
vacy.7 7 Conversely, an absolute rule barring a court from compelling a
victim to undergo a psychological examination only considers the vic-
tim's privacy interest. The solution that would consider and weigh all of
the necessary interests would give the court some degree of discretion.
Many courts have realized this necessity7" and have adopted the balanc-
ing rule espoused in Ballard v. Superior Court.79
In Ballard, the California Supreme Court determined that a trial judge
has discretion to order a psychological examination of a prosecutrix in a
sexual offense case if the defendant presents compelling reasons for or-
dering such an examination. 0 The Ballard court developed a balancing
test to determine if the defendant's burden had been met. 81 The court
noted that a psychological examination might be compelled if little or no
corroborative evidence supported the charge, or if the defense questioned
the effect of the complaining witness's mental or emotional condition
upon her veracity. 2
Under a Ballard view, the court determines whether the prejudice to
the defendant that will result if the prosecutrix is not required to undergo
a psychological examination outweighs the intrusion into the prosecu-
trix's protected right of privacy that will occur if the examination takes
place. If undue prejudice is found,83 the court will order a psychological
77. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). This invasion can occur when a
psychological examination of the prosecutrix is not necessary to promote the defendant's
or the state's interests, for example, where her testimony is corroborated. See United
States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 341 (1966).
78. See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 174-75, 410 P.2d 838, 848, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 312 (1966); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 15, 256 N.E.2d 901, 902 (1970);
People v. Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 284, 524 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (1988).
79. 64 Cal. 2d at 159, 410 P.2d at 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
80. Id., 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
81. See id. at 176-77, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
82. See id., 412 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313; see also People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d
187, 188, 443 P.2d 794, 800, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212, cert. denied 393 U.S. 864 (1968)
(witness afflicted by mental disease may have impaired memory or sense of perception);
People v. Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d 279, 282, 524 N.Y.S.2d 153, 156 (1988) (prosecutrix's
mental state may affect her ability to tell truth). The Ballard court recognized that there
are situations in which a prosecutrix may fabricate a story about a sexual offense, for
example, when the evidence demonstrates a history of mental problems impairing her
ability to distinguish fact from fantasy. See Ballard, 64 Cal. 2d at 171, 410 P.2d at 846,
40 Cal. Rptr. at 310. The court believed that in these situations, a psychological exami-
nation is warranted. Id. at 161, 412 P.2d at 849-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 305. However, the
court also noted that where the prosecutrix's testimony is corroborated, or where the
court finds no indication that the prosecutrix is lying, or is mentally or emotionally unsta-
ble, a psychological examination is unnecessary. Id. at 175-76, 412 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal.
Rptr. at 313.
83. A court determines whether there is undue prejudice by observing the complain-
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examination. 4 If, however, the intrusion into the prosecutrix's protected
right of privacy is greater than the prejudice that will result to the de-
fendant, the examination will not be ordered. 5
Even if a court determines that a psychological examination is neces-
sary, the prosecutrix could refuse to submit to the examination despite a
court order. If this occurs, she cannot be physically forced to acqui-
esce. 6 There are, however, several things that a court can do to safe-
guard a defendant's interests in light of such a refusal.8 7
First, the court can use its contempt powers to place the prosecutrix
either in coercive civil or criminal contempt for refusing to comply with
a court order.88 The court can also impose fines or sanctions on an un-
willing prosecutrix as a penalty for non-compliance.8 9 In addition, the
court can inform the jury that the prosecutrix has refused to submit to a
court-ordered psychological examination, and let the jury consider this
as a factor in its deliberations.90 This will bring to the jury's attention
the court's belief that a psychological examination of the prosecutrix was
warranted, and that the victim refused to comply.
Finally, the court may refuse to allow a prosecutrix's testimony into
evidence if the prosecutrix refuses a court-ordered psychological exami-
nation.91 At times, a district attorney may put the victim of a sexual
crime on the stand, as a witness, to arouse the jury's sympathy.92 How-
ever, a court may refuse to allow the prosecutrix to testify in a sexual
offense case when faced with her unwillingness to submit to a court-or-
ant's habits both before and during trial. See Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 874
(3d Cir. 1980); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 16, 256 N.E.2d 901, 902 (1970). If the
court observes that the complainant is a controlled substance user, see Scuito, 623 F.2d at
874, is frequently in altered states of consciousness, or uses mind altering drugs, the court
will order a psychological examination to avoid undue prejudice to the defendant. See id.
Courts do not rely solely on their own observations of the prosecutrix to make this
determination. See Ballard, 64 Cal. 2d at 160, 410 P.2d at 840, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 305;
Easterday, 254 Ind. at 17, 256 N.E.2d at 903. The defendant can introduce evidence that
puts the prosecutrix's credibility in doubt, for example, a prior perjury conviction, see
Easterday, 254 Ind. at 18, 256 N.E.2d at 904, or a record of mental illness. See Ballard,
64 Cal.2d at 160, 410 P.2d at 840, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
84. See Easterday, 254 Ind. at 14, 256 N.E.2d at 901; Griffin, 138 Misc. 2d at 282, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 154.
85. See Ballard, 64 Cal. 2d at 177, 410 P.2d at 850, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
The intrusion into the prosecutrix's protected right of privacy is greater than any preju-
dice that will result to the defendant when no corroboration supports the sexual offense
charge, see id., 410 P.2d at 840, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 312, or when the victim's mental condi-
tion impairs her ability to tell the truth. See id., 410 P.2d at 840, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
86. See People v. Mills, 87 Cal. App. 3d 302, 304, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71, 73-74 (1978).
87. Id. at 305, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
88. See R. Shoben & J. Tabb, Remedies 229-30 (1989); see also United States v. Prof-
fitt, 498 F.2d 1124, 1130 (3d Cir. 1974) (defendant held in contempt for refusal to submit
to psychiatric examination). The purpose of criminal and coercive civil contempt is to
vindicate the power of the court. Id.
89. See R. Shoben & J. Tabb, supra note 89 at 230.
90. See Mills, 87 Cal. App. 3d 302, 304, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (1978).
91. Id. at 305, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
92. See S. Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1088 (1986).
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dered psychological examination.9" The prosecution's case may be weak-
ened by its inability to arouse the jury's sympathy, thereby protecting
innocent defendants.
CONCLUSION
At times, a prosecutrix may exaggerate or even fabricate a story of a
sexual offense, placing an innocent man in danger of being convicted of a
serious crime. If, however, there is no reason to doubt her credibility and
her testimony is corroborated, forcing the victim to submit to a psycho-
logical examination will unnecessarily add to her trauma. In the latter
situation, a compulsory psychological examination is neither necessary
nor warranted. In the former situation, however, where there is the dan-
ger of fabrication, a compulsory psychological examination of the prose-
cutrix is essential. The Ballard balancing analysis gives a court the
flexibility to order a psychological examination of a prosecutrix in situa-
tions where the harm to the accused outweighs the harm to the prosecu-
trix. In addition, the Ballard balancing analysis preserves the integrity of
the criminal justice system and protects the interests of all parties
concerned.
Judith Greenberg
93. See Mills, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
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